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Employee Self-Representation and the
Law in the United States
Matthew W. Finkin *
Collective representation has been a legal focal point in the United States for nearly a
century. Little attention has been paid to the law in the obverse situation: individual selfrepresentation. This essay explores how, on some issues, the law supports a regime of
individual bargaining while, on others, is antithetical to it. In other words, US law is incoherent
on the matter. By reference to law in Australia and New Zealand, this paper argues that more
legal space can be created for employees to represent themselves.
La représentation collective fait depuis près d’un siècle l’objet de beaucoup de commentaires
juridiques aux États-Unis. On fait toutefois peu de cas de l’attitude des tribunaux dans la
situation ou les travailleurs se représentent eux-mêmes. Cet article examine la manière
dont la justice, dans certains cas, favorise un régime de négociation individuelle alors que,
dans d’autres circonstances, elle y est opposée. Autrement dit, la justice américaine affiche
une certaine incohérence en la matière. En comparaison du système judiciaire australien et
néo-zélandais, cet article prétend que les travailleurs devraient jouir de meilleures conditions
juridiques pour se représenter eux-mêmes.

*

Albert J Harno & Edward W Cleary Chair in Law, the University of Illinois. An earlier
version of this article was originally presented at the Voices At Work North American
Workshop (16-17 March 2012), hosted at Osgoode Hall Law School, York University,
Toronto and funded by the Leverhulme Trust, the Centre for Labour Management Relations
at Ryerson University, and Osgoode Hall Law School. The author would like to express
his appreciation to Breen Creighton and Gordon Anderson for very helpful comments on
Australian and New Zealand law respectively, and to the participants in the workshop. The
final draft has benefitted from additional comments by Steven Willborn and two anonymous
readers for the Osgoode Hall Law Journal, to all of whom thanks are due.
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I. Introduction: The Demand For SelfRepresentation
Richard Freeman and Joel Rogers’ survey of what American workers want

revealed not only a yawning representation gap, but also the presence of rather
nuanced desires in terms of the forms in which employee voice would be
expressed.1 Significantly, Freeman and Rogers learned that although a majority
felt more comfortable raising workplace issues through an employee association,
a significant cohort preferred to deal with their employers individually or with
the help of a co-worker. The sorts of issues with respect to which this preference
was expressed are set out below in Table 1.

1.

Richard B Freeman & Joel Rogers, What Workers Want (New York: Cornell University Press,
1999). The desire for representation and for forms of representation other than collective
bargaining was further explored by Freeman. See Richard B Freeman, “Can the United
States Clear the Market for Representation and Participation?” in Richard B Freeman, Peter
F Boxall & Peter Haynes, eds, What Workers Say: Employee Voice in the Anglo-American
Workplace (New York: Cornell University Press, 2007) ch 1.
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TABLE 1: Employee Voice Preference Depending on the Problem
Benefits

Health/Safety

Training at
Job

Unfair
Treatment

Sexual
Harassment

Percentage who
prefer to solve
problems with
the help of fellow
employees

66

53

44

39

34

By Self

33

36

54

59

65

Don’t Know

1

1

2

3

1

SOURCE: Richard B Freeman & Joel Rogers, What Workers Want (New York: Cornell University Press,
1999) at 55.

Freeman and Rogers declined to pursue this aspect of what their survey revealed,
but others have become intrigued by the subject of individual voice. This subject
was never abandoned by those of neo-liberal or libertarian persuasion,2 but it is
now beginning to draw more mainstream legal academic interest,3 stimulated by
the decline of American unionism and the concomitant claim of replacement by
“an individual system of employee representation.”4
Yuval Feldman, Amir Falk, and Miri Katy have surveyed employees in Israel.
They found that, along with other variables, younger and better-educated workers
prefer individual to collective bargaining.5 Kenneth Dau-Schmidt and Timothy
Haley surveyed the content of individual and collective agreements in the United
States.6 They confirmed that “in the world of individual bargaining,” the terms
2.
3.

4.
5.
6.

For a survey of this literature, see Kenneth G Dau-Schmidt, “Promoting Employee Voice in
the American Economy: A Call for Comprehensive Reform” (2011) 94:3 Marq L Rev 765 at
773-84.
See e.g. Cynthia Estlund, Regoverning the Workplace: From Self-Regulation to Co-Regulation
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010); Mordehai Mironi, “Reframing the Representation
Debate: Going Beyond Union and Non-Union Options” (2010) 63:3 Indus & Lab Rel Rev
367; Anne Marie Lofaso, “Talking is Worthwhile: The Role of Employee Voice in Protecting,
Enhancing, and Encouraging Individual Rights to Job Security in a Collective System”
(2010) 14 Employee Rts & Employment Pol’y J 55.
Leo Troy as cited by Hoyt N Wheeler, The Future of the American Labor Movement
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002) at 4.
Yuval Feldman, Amir Falk & Miri Katz, “What Workers Really Want: Voice, Unions, and
Personal Contracts” (2011) 15 Employee Rts & Employment Pol’y J 237.
Kenneth G Dau-Schmidt & Timothy A Haley, “Governance of the Workplace: The
Contemporary Regime of Individual Contract” (2007) 28 Comp Lab L & Pol’y J 131.
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of the contract focussed on the situation of the “marginal worker” (one who is
young and likely to leave, in contrast to the collective agreements’ focus on the
“median worker,” one who is older and less likely to leave), and tended to favour
the employers’ interests.7
Cynthia Estlund has made a compelling case for greater informational
transparency in the labour market on the assumption that this will “improve
the efficiency of employment contracts.”8 In turn, this assumes an individual
bargaining process in which informational asymmetry is an obstruction to
efficient bargaining. Estlund’s argument is directed to initial hire: The applicant,
unlike an incumbent, is not likely to know much about the employer or the
workplace, and so, informational asymmetry will be a salient aspect of the
bargaining process, if there is one. As James Brudney has observed, the law in the
United States does take some small steps to address this situation:
Courts reviewing disputes at the hiring stage are prepared to impose upon
knowledgeable and powerful employers an affirmative duty to provide truthful or
at least non-distortive information to vulnerable employees regarding their prospective employment. But once these unequally endowed employers and employees have
formed a contract, the great majority of jurisdictions regard it as unjustified and
unwise to insist on a similar affirmative duty of honest dealing.9

In contrast to initial hire, the issue of self-representation in the workplace
assumes an ongoing employment relationship; it is concerned with how the law
deals with employees who wish to affect their terms or conditions of employment
going forward, not through a collective, but as individuals.
On this, the law in the United States is a “dog’s breakfast”: the right to speak
for oneself is accorded only parsimoniously and on a piecemeal basis, and where
not accorded, an effort to speak is fair game for employer sanction. To be sure,
most employees are not sanctioned for seeking to deal individually with their
employers, nor could a non-totalitarian employment relations system function
were that not the case. But, to the extent such courses of dealing are conducted
under the shadow of the law, there is a disconnect between reality and the law,
with the latter casting a pall over the former and over the idea of individual agency.
7.
8.
9.

Their review could suggest that the terms they surveyed, governing benefits and postemployment competition, were either adhesive or, if there really was a bargaining process,
that employers had superior bargaining power.
Cynthia Estlund, “Just the Facts: The Case for Workplace Transparency” (2011) 63:2 Stan L
Rev 351 at 357.
James J Brudney, “Reluctance and Remorse: The Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
in American Employment Law” (2011) 32 Comp Lab L & Pol’y J 773 at 807-08 [citation
omitted] [Brudney, “Reluctance”].
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The following discussion explores and explains this disconnect. Towards the
close, sidelong glances will be taken at two members of the common law legal
family that, by legislation, have sought to accommodate the desire for selfrepresentation more generally. These are merely instructive of the range of the
possible; they broaden the legal horizon. But from what appears, the United
States will continue to muddle through, professing a belief in individual liberty
that the law largely belies.

II. Individual Bargaining and the Law
From the last quarter of the nineteenth century and into the second quarter of the
twentieth, combat raged between two competing conceptions of the ordering of
industrial society and of the status of the employee in it.10 The war was waged in the
lofty heights of academic theory, in the less refined pages of polemical pamphlets
and the popular press, and in the trenches of industrial conflict, sometimes with
lethal effect. On one side stood Capital, supported by the theoretical scaffolding
provided by laissez-faire economists. They argued that the American employee
was an autonomous actor possessed of agency, free to sell his or her labour to an
employer on mutually agreeable terms. Necessarily, individual bargaining was
conducted in the context of the law of obligations, of contract and tort. The
latter protected the parties against deceit or other socially unacceptable sharp
practice; the former assured the parties’ performance. But that was as far as the
law should go. Labour-protective law not only defeated the market, denying
the public the benefits of market mediation, it stripped the individual of
agency. Such laws were exercises in naked paternalism that negated the ability
of the person to be an autonomous bargainer in the market acting upon his
or her freely chosen preferences. In this light, unions were nothing more than
10. Montgomery captured the times thusly:
The contest so pervaded social life that the ideology of acquisitive individualism, which
explained and justified a society regulated by market mechanisms and propelled by the
accumulation of capital, was challenged by an ideology of mutualism, rooted in working-class
bondings and struggles. Chief Justice Paxson had charged the Homestead strikers with ‘insurrection
and rebellion against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,’ and painter Theodore Rhodie accused
the Pullman Company of depriving him not only of income but also of his ‘right as an American
citizen’ to espouse and live by union principles.

See David Montgomery, The Fall of the House of Labor (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 1987) at 171 [footnote omitted]. On how this contest played out after the
century’s turn, see Irving Bernstein, The Lean Years: A History of the American Worker 19201933 (Cambridge, Mass: The Riverside Press, 1960).
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rent-seeking cartels that distorted the market, with negative consequences for
consumers and the unrepresented.
On the other side stood Labour, supported by Progressive reformers and
institutional economists. They argued that the lone employee’s actual capacity
to exercise agency was chimerical for the simple and obvious reason that the
individual had little or no bargaining power. Actual agency—meaningful
voice—was achieved by collective, not individual bargaining. To them, the law
should step in to aid the weaker party by allowing the individual to collectivize.
At and beyond the century’s turn, laissez-faire largely prevailed: the Thirteenth
Amendment had freed the employee of wage bondage; substantive due process
constrained the states from interfering in freedom of contract; and the at-will
rule conduced towards the free play of individual bargaining, as both employer
and employee could at any time demand a change in wages or employment
conditions on pain of terminating the relationship summarily. Even where
the state was sustained in its capacity to enact labour-protective truck (wage
payment) laws as an exception to the Constitution’s protection of freedom of
contract, it was licensed to do so in the name of achieving better equality in
individual bargaining, the result of which prevented labour hoarding and so
further contributed to labour mobility, towards a freer labour market.11
By the late 1930s, the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)12 marked a
sea change in constitutional doctrine. Not only did it open the door for more
labour-protective legislation, it enshrined the conception of the employee as a
lone—perhaps even timid and inarticulate—actor whose capacity to exercise
real agency is effected by group, not individual voice.13 Under this scheme,
employers have to bargain with the employee’s collective representative in good
faith. In this way, the exercise of voice in the workplace is made meaningful.14
11. Harbison v Knoxville Iron Co, 103 Tenn 421, 53 SW 955 (1899) [Harbison], aff’d Knoxville
Iron Company v Harbison, 183 US 13, 22 S Ct 1 (1901). The law places the employee and
the employer “more nearly upon an equality. This alone commends the Act and entitles it to
a place on the statute book…” (Harbison, ibid at 443). By requiring full payment of wages in
US currency on a set pay period basis, these laws prevented withholding and forfeiture that,
in effect, bound the employee to the job.
12. 29 USC §§ 151-169 (1935) [NRLA].
13. The US Supreme Court was to give vivid expression to this perception. See National Labor
Relations Board v J Weingarten Inc, 420 US 251 at 262-63, 95 S Ct 959 (1975).
14. See Arditi Bagchi, “Who Should Talk? What Counts as Employee Voice and Who
Stands to Gain” (2011) 94 Marq L Rev 869 at 871. Bagchi deploys a different taxonomy,
distinguishing between “hard” and “soft” voice:
First, “hard” voice refers to the ability to exercise power and shape the direction of the firm and
its treatment of employees in particular. Second, “soft” voice refers to the ability to engage in
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But under this scheme, the individual loses all power to bargain directly with the
employer because a collective representative is in place.15
The question presented here concerns the status of the 93.4 per cent of
American workers in the private sector today who are not collectively represented.16
When the NLRA was enacted, the assumption was that individual employees had
few rights that an employer was compelled to respect. Over the past half century
much has changed, and to that extent, space has been created for the exercise of
individual voice. Let us turn to that first.
A. Federal Law
1.

Invoking a Specific Statutory Employment Right

When an employee invokes a statutory right—to be free of sexual harassment,
to take family or medical leave—the courts require a serious engagement on the
employer’s part and can require a course of dealing with the employee, bolstered
by a statutory prohibition on retaliation for having made the complaint or demand.
In some instances, the required course of dealing is framed in terms of individual
bargaining. Under the Americans with Disabilities Act and Title VII’s prohibition of
discrimination on grounds of religion, for example, an employer has a legal duty to
accommodate an employee with a statutory disability or with a religious objection to
a working condition.17 In a term crafted to define the obligation in the former, but
which is equally applicable to the latter, the law expects the employer to engage in a
dialogue with or provide feedback to the relevant decision-makers.

The ability to exercise power to shape the direction of the firm isn’t voice; it is just what
Bagchi says it is, managerial power. Voice is not the ability to engage in dialogue, it is the
power to compel the other party to engage in dialogue. That is how the Labor Act conceives
it: The duty to bargain requires the employer to meet and confer in good faith over the
subject of the bargain in an effort to reach an agreement. “Soft” voice in this context would
be the employee’s ability to protest; it does not require the employer to engage in dialogue, or
even to listen.
15. See generally, Robert A Gorman & Matthew Finkin, Labor Law Analysis and Advocacy
[forthcoming in 2013] ch 19. The Labor Act contains a provision giving represented
employees a “right” to present grievances individually subject to certain conditions. See 29
USC § 159(a) (2012). However, the US Supreme Court opined that the provision does not
accord a “right” in the sense that it triggers an obligation on the employer’s part to entertain
the grievance. See Emporium Capwell Co v Western Addition Community Organization, 420
US 50 at 61, 95 S Ct 977 (1975).
16. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, News Release, USDL-13-0105, “Union Members — 2012”
(23 January 2013) online: <http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf> (reporting
6.6% private sector union density in 2012).
17. See 42 USC § 12112 (1990); 42 USC § 2000e-2 (1964).
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“meaningful interactive process”18 with the employee in a joint effort to see whether
an accommodation can be reached without undue hardship on the conduct of the
business. The phrase captures the concept of interest-based bargaining—where
each party is expected to understand the other’s needs and seek to achieve a
specific result accommodating both—and subjects that process to judicial
scrutiny of its bona fides.19
Echoes of statutory support for meaningful self-representation can be found in
other measures. The Older Workers Benefit Protection Act of 199020 regulates employee
waiver of rights or claims asserted under age discrimination law. It imposes even more
exacting standards when such a waiver is made in conjunction with an exit incentive
or termination program, all to assure that such waivers are “knowing and voluntary.”21
18. See 29 CFR § 1630.2(o)(3) (2012). This regulation outlines the steps for a “flexible,
interactive process.” The federal courts routinely apply it. Cf US Airways Inc v Barnett, 535
US 391 at 407, 122 S Ct 1516 (2002), Stevens J.
19. See e.g. US Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v UPS Supply Chain Solutions, 620
F (3d) 1103, US App LEXIS 17918 (9th Cir 2010); Tobin v Liberty Mutual Insurance
Company, 433 F (3d) 100 at 108-109, US App LEXIS 28902 (1st Cir 2005). I am indebted
to Rebecca White for bringing the latter to my attention. She has pointed out that where no
accommodation would have been achieved, no process of meaningful interaction is required.
See McBride v BIC Consumer Products Manufacturing Company Inc, 583 F (3d) 92, US App
LEXIS 21771 (2d Cir 2009). But as much is true under certain circumstances of collective
bargaining. See United Food and Commercial Workers International Union AFL-CIO, Local No
150-A v National Labor Relations Board, 1 F (3d) 24, 303 US App DC 65 (DC Cir 1993)
(collective bargaining over plant relocation not required if it would have been futile).
20. 29 USC §§ 621-634 (2012).
21. 29 USC § 626(f )(1) (2012). The effectiveness of a waiver of age-based claims turns upon
whether:

(A) the waiver is part of an agreement between the individual and the employer that is written
in a manner calculated to be understood by such individual, or by the average individual
eligible to participate;
(B) the waiver specifically refers to rights or claims arising under this Act;
(C) the individual does not waive rights or claims that may arise after the date the waiver is
executed;
(D) the individual waives rights or claims only in exchange for consideration in addition to
anything of value to which the individual already is entitled;
(E) the individual is advised in writing to consult with an attorney prior to executing the
agreement;
(F) (i) the individual is given a period of at least 21 days within which to consider the agreement …
(G) the agreement provides that for a period of at least 7 days following the execution of such
agreement, the individual may revoke the agreement, and the agreement shall not become
effective or enforceable until the revocation period has expired… .

But, under subsection (F)(ii):
if a waiver is requested in connection with an exit incentive or other employment termination
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It contemplates and is in aid of a “course of negotiation” between the employer and
the individual employee.22
Other measures assume that bargaining will occur, and strive to assure
fairness. The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), for example, which requires a
minimum wage and overtime pay, allows those statutory claims to be settled or
compromised by the affected employees.23 However, it has been held that such a
negotiated settlement requires either the supervision of the Department of Labor,
or approval by a court after suit has been brought.24 In the latter scenario, the
employees are represented by counsel and “the settlement is more likely to reflect
a reasonable compromise of disputed issues than a mere waiver of statutory rights
brought about by an employer’s overreaching.”25
These discrete pockets of protection have a larger dimension. In a world in
which more employment rights are accorded—where, for example, employers
might be required to give notice that they are considering a change in federally
regulated benefits (such as pension benefits26 or stock options in closely held
corporations27)—and employers might wish to seek waivers or agreed-upon
program offered to a group or class of employees, the individual is given a period of at least 45
days within which to consider the agreement… .
And:

(H) if a waiver is requested in connection with an exit incentive or other employment termination
program offered to a group or class of employees, the employer (at the commencement
of the period specified in subparagraph (F) informs the individual in writing in a manner
calculated to be understood by the average individual eligible to participate, as to—
i. any class, unit, or group of individuals covered by such program, any eligibility factors
for such program, and any time limits applicable to such program; and
ii. the job titles and ages of all individuals eligible or selected for the program, and the
ages of all individuals in the same job classification or organizational unit who are not
eligible or selected for the program.

22. Oubre v Entergy Operations Inc, 522 US 422 at 426, 118 S Ct 838 (1998).
23. 29 USC § 216(c) (2012).
24. Lynn’s Food Stores Inc v US Department of Labor, Employment Standards Administration, Wage
and Hour Division, 679 F (2d) 1350, 65 ALR Fed 691 (11th Cir 1982) [Lynn’s Food Stores];
Bouzzi v F&J Pine Restaurant, LLC, 841 F Supp (2d) 635, US Dist LEXIS 3489 (EDNY
2012) (reviewing authority). Cf Martin v Spring Break ’83 Productions, LLC, 688 F (3d) 247,
US App LEXIS 15285 (5th Cir 2012) (union may settle FLSA claim where complaining
employees were represented by counsel and accepted the sums paid, distinguishing Lynn’s
Food Stores on its facts).
25. Lynn’s Food Stores, supra note 24 at 1345.
26. See e.g. Ballone v Eastman Kodak Co, 109 F (3d) 117, US App LEXIS 5430 (2d Cir 1997);
Hockett v Sun Company Inc, 109 F (3d) 1515, US App LEXIS 5827 (10th Cir 1997). I am
indebted to Steven Willborn for bringing these to my attention.
27. Jordan v Duff and Phelps Inc, 815 F (2d) 429, US App LEXIS 4036 (7th Cir 1987).
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modifications of those rights, a process of individual bargaining might well
result. (Much the same might be true when it is the employee who seeks the
change, but doing so may not be protected; in fact, the courts are divided on
whether an individual’s inquiry about the status of his or her pension benefits is
protected by federal law from employer sanction.28) The fairness of the ensuing
process might be subject to scrutiny under common law standards and, to that
extent, would afford scope, albeit limited, for self-representation. As we will see,
this scenario is echoed in the common law of some states.
2.

Individual Bargaining at Large

The Labor Act establishes a legal regime for collective, not individual bargaining.
Accordingly, the National Labor Relations Board held rather early on that it would
not certify a representative for a bargaining unit that consisted of only a single
person.29 The Labor Act does protect the single employee when he or she engages in
concerted activity for mutual protection other than collective bargaining—when
he or she acts on behalf of a group or as a preliminary to group action. But under
the current state of the law, a single employee acting on his or her own behalf
in seeking better pay, benefits, working conditions, or simple fairness, would
be unprotected for want of concert or mutuality, and could be dismissed for
having so sought. Were employee Oliver Twist to say to his employer today,
“Please, sir, I want some more,” he could be dismissed.30 An at-will employee can
be discharged for any reason—even an arbitrary or morally repugnant reason—so
long as it is not an unlawful reason, and seeking to bargain individually with
an employer for better terms is not legally protected activity under federal law.31 If,
28. For a review of authority, see George v Junior Achievement of Central Indiana Inc, 694 F (3d)
812, US App LEXIS 18571 (7th Cir 2012) [Junior Achievement]. In this case, the court held
that the inquiry was statutorily insulated from employer sanction.
29. Luckenbach Steamship Company Inc v Gatemen, Watchmen and Miscellaneous Waterfront
Workers Union, Local 38-124, 2 NLRB 181 (1936) [Luckenbach Steamship]. Whether
collective agreements negotiated for single person bargaining units are enforceable under the
Labor Act is a separate question. See the discussion in Local 377, RWDSU, UFCW v 1864
Tenants Association, 181 LRRM 2817, US Dist LEXIS 14766 (SDNY 2007), aff’d 533 F (3d)
98, 184 LRRM 2596 (2d Cir 2008).
30. Matthew W Finkin, “Labor Law by Boz—A Theory of Meyers Industries Inc, Sears, Roebuck
and Co, and Bird Engineering” (1985) 71 Iowa L Rev 155 at 157. The trope has become a bit
shopworn.
31. See Litton Systems Inc v Provost, 173 NLRB No 153, 173 NLRB 1024 (1968) [Litton
Systems]. In Litton Systems, an employee who was dismissed for asking for a raise of $2.80
per week was held to be unprotected. (In today’s dollars, the requests would be for a raise
of $18.71 per week. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, CPI Inflation Calculator, online: United
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instead, employee Twist had used the first person plural: “Please, sir, we want
some more,” he could not be dismissed.32 More on this later.
B. State Law
1.

Invoking a Specific Statutory Employment Right

Insofar as state law might replicate or expand upon federally legislated workplace
rights, the law would echo the ensuing individual bargaining scenario the claim
or demand would entail, sometimes explicitly.33 So too, where an employer
States Department of Labor <http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm>.) There
are further cases where discharge for the individual request of a wage increase was held to
be unprotected. See National Wax Company v Stephany, 251 NLRB No 147, 251 NLRB
1064 (1980); Parker Laboratories Inc v Jensen, 267 NLRB No 162, 267 NLRB 1174 (1983);
Allied Erecting and Dismantling Company Inc v Collins Jr, 270 NLRB No 48, 270 NLRB
277 (1984). The Iowa Supreme Court has held that a public employer may discharge an
employee for demanding a pay increase from a private sector employer, for whom he worked
part-time, with the knowledge and consent of the public employer. See Clay County, Iowa v
Public Employment Relations Board, 784 NW (2d) 1, 188 LRRM 2857 (2010).
32. Employee said “we,” referring to himself and one other. See Approved Electric Corp v Local
25, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 356 NLRB No 45, 189 LRRM (BNA)
1433 (2010). See also Wyndham Resort Development Corp v Foley, 356 NLRB No 104 at 2,
190 LRRM (BNA) 1121 (2011) (“The concerted nature of an employee’s protest may…
be revealed by evidence that the employee used terms like ‘us’ or ‘we’…”). Nevertheless, a
small corner of federal law, devised to respond to the repression of collective protest, may
actually provide some limited breathing space for individual bargaining, albeit in unusual
circumstances. The Norris-LaGuardia Act (29 USC ch 6) prohibits the federal courts
from enjoining any person from giving publicity to the existence of or the facts in any
labour dispute not involving fraud. See 29 USC § 104(e) (2012). However, a fraudulent
representation could be subject to injunction. A labour dispute is defined as any controversy
concerning terms or conditions of employment, even if it involves only a single person.
Ibid, § 113(c). One of the preconditions for a lawful injunction—for example, where
the claims are fraudulent—is that the complainant seeking it must first have made “every
reasonable effort to settle such dispute … by negotiation.” Ibid, § 108. For example, consider
an employer who claims it is being falsely accused by an employee of wrongful workplace
action in a “labor dispute” by emails to the incumbent workforce. If that employer seeks to
acquire an injunction to prevent circulation of the emails from a federal or state court, in a
jurisdiction that has legislatively echoed the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the Act would require that
the employer show it has made a reasonable effort to negotiate a resolution of the underlying
dispute. Cf Pulte Homes Inc v Laborers’ International Union of North America, 648 F (3d) 295,
191 LRRM 2161 (7th Cir 2011).
33. See e.g. Cal Gov’t Code § 12940(n) (2012). This makes it an unlawful employment practice:
For an employer or other entity covered by this part to fail to engage in a timely, good
faith, interactive process with the employee or applicant to determine effective reasonable
accommodations, if any, in response to a request for reasonable accommodation by an employee
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wishes its employees to waive their right to invoke protective law judicially and,
instead, to submit their legal claims to an employer-adopted arbitration system,
some courts have applied the doctrine of unconscionability to determine the
effectiveness of the employee’s agreement.34 As the US Supreme Court made
plain, the fact that the arbitration agreement is one of adhesion does not render
the agreement unconscionable per se;35 but insofar as the states remain free
to decide on a case-by-case basis whether, under specific circumstances, the
employee had some meaningful choice,36 possibly including an opportunity to
negotiate,37 the law would give breathing space for self-representation.
So too, state wage payment laws commonly deal with the question of deductions
from wages. Often written consent is required, but at least two states, Illinois and
Michigan, subject consent to a test of voluntariness.38 In this, state law bolsters a
regime of free agency by assuring the agent’s freedom.
Less strongly, state unemployment compensation benefits law may speak to
individual representation by requiring an employee who quits due to allegedly
unacceptable working conditions to have made a reasonable attempt to have the
situation rectified prior to quitting.39 This places the burden on the employee
to seek to negotiate with his or her employer on pain of losing the benefit.
The employer is not required to negotiate, but the employer’s failure to respond
reasonably would expose it to liability for the benefit. In other words, although the
law here does not mandate a meaningful interactive process, it certainly encourages it.

or applicant with a known physical or mental disability or known medical condition.

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

See also, Russell v Cooley Dickinson Hospital Inc, 772 NE (2d) 1054 at 1065, 437 Mass 443
(Sup Jud Ct 2002). Contra Kezer v Central Maine Medical Center, 40 A (3d) 955 at 963,
2012 ME 54 (Sup Jud Ct) (Maine law makes an employer’s engagement in a “good faith
interactive process” an affirmative defence to a disability claim; it does not directly require an
employer to “engage in such a consultation”).
See e.g. Adler v Fred Lind Manor, 103 P (3d) 773 at 783, 153 Wn (2d) 331 (Wash Sup Ct
2004) [Adler]; Seawright v American General Financial Services, Inc, 507 F (3d) 967, 2007 US
App LEXIS 26328 (Tenn 6th Cir).
AT&T Mobility LLC v Vincent Concepcion, 131 S Ct 1740, 179 L Ed (2d) 742 (2010).
Adler, supra note 34 at 783.
Stirlen v Supercuts, Inc, 60 Cal Rptr (2d) 138 at 154, 51 Cal App 4th 1519 (Ct App 1997). Cf
Franco v Arakelian Enterprises Inc, 211 Cal App (4th) 314, 149 Cal Rptr (3d) 530 (Ct App
2012).
Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act, 820 ILCS 115/9 (agreement must be “given freely”
at the time); Mich Comp L § 408.477(1) (1978) (consent must be obtained “without
intimidation or fear of discharge for refusal to permit the deduction”).
See e.g. Bombard v Department of Labor (Fisher Auto Parts Inc), 2010 VT 100, 12 A (3d) 533.
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2.

Individual Bargaining At Large

The law of employment falls primarily to the states, and a state might address
employee voice in more generally protective terms. As Brudney notes, some
courts do require good faith leading up to acceptance of employment in the sense
that active deception, or, more importantly, a failure to disclose material facts,
might be actionable.40 In this, the law corrects for informational asymmetry and so
facilitates a bargaining process. But, as Brudney points out, in most jurisdictions
this obligation does not apply once an at-will employment has been entered
into. In most jurisdictions, an employer can lie or fail to inform the employee
of material facts in order to induce—or lull—the employee into remaining in
employment.41 The stated ground is that because the employment was held at
will, there could be no damage done; the employee could have been terminated
at any time for any reason. This blinks at the fact that the employee was not
terminated for no reason; he or she was kept on in ignorance, allowing the
employer to benefit from the employee’s performance, all while it sought greater
benefit by considering and later taking job-destructive action. To the extent the
courts are driven by the lack of any demonstrable damage in an employee remaining
in an at-will job, they have ignored the employee’s opportunity cost.42
40. Brudney, “Reluctance,” supra note 9.
41. This doctrine was adopted in Mackenzie v Miller Brewing Company, 2001 WI 23, 623
NW (2d) 739 (Sup Ct). See also Cocchiara v Lithia Motors Inc, 270 P (3d) 350, 247 Ore
App 545 (2011) (attending, however, only the loss of the promised position and not the
one foregone). Cf Sawyer v EI Dupont de Nemours & Co, 689 F (3d) 463, 193 LRRM
3148 (5th Cir 2012) (certifying question to the Texas Supreme Court). Delaware is one
of very few jurisdictions to extend the covenant of good faith and fair dealing to forbid
active misrepresentation to an at-will employee to remain in a current position. As the
exception to the at-will rule is to be “narrowly defined,” it is not clear that it would extend
to a withholding of unrequested information. See Owens v Connections Community Support
Programs Inc, 840 F Supp (2d) 791 at 798, US Dist LEXIS 1590 (D Del 2012).
42. Another explanation may be in the difficulties of deciding just when job destructive business
plans need be disclosed i.e. plans that may ripen but may never reach full fruition. Disclosure
may cause valued employees to look, and leave for a greener, or more secure, pasture. This
practical problem is no different, however, for employees who work under contracts of stated
term to which the at-will exemption to deception does not apply. This rationale, which
appears nowhere in the case law, only highlights how the employer benefits by keeping
the employee in ignorance. Interestingly, some courts have placed a duty on employees to
inform their employers of their interest in, or plans for leaving the employment to engage
in competitive activity. See Kenneth G Dau-Schmidt, Robert N Covington & Matthew
W Finkin, Legal Protection for the Individual Employee, 4th ed (St Paul, Minn: West Group,
2010) at 238-40. Apparently, the obligation of good faith runs in only one direction.
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These decisions are also vexing doctrinally. The law conceives of an at-will
relationship as a continuous series of offers and acceptance, where both parties
keep a weather eye, so to speak, on economic, technological, and demographic
change, and are free to renegotiate the terms from moment to moment. If the
law’s role is to correct for informational asymmetry in the bargaining process
leading up to an at-will relationship, in aid of efficient bargaining, one is
hard-pressed to see why that information-correcting, bargaining-enhancing
role would not be equally applicable during the course of an at-will relationship.
The refusal to apply an obligation of good faith during the course of an at-will
employment relationship is inconsistent with a legal regime supportive of
individual bargaining.
However, a number of states have held that employer policies setting out terms
and conditions of employment can rise to the level of contractual commitment—
for example, in affording some form of job security.43 In a few such jurisdictions,
an employer would not be free to unilaterally to alter or abrogate such a policy:
The employer must offer and secure acceptance of the modification with requisite
consideration.44 In these jurisdictions, the law would support a process of individual
bargaining potentially bolstered by doctrines of unconscionability or economic
duress.45 Here the law echoes what it requires for the knowing and voluntary waiver
of a statutory right.
To shift gears, the states are also free to fashion employment relations
policy for those enterprises not governed by federal law, most often because
they fall short of the Labor Board’s jurisdictional limits. Though small in size,
these enterprises are not small in number. In the past, New York and Pennsylvania
applied their labour relations laws to allow for single person bargaining units where
single employees work in enterprises engaged in a common industry, e.g. as
building superintendents or motion picture operators.46 The New York court
stressed the statutory concern: “to encourage collective bargaining throughout
43. See e.g. Duldulao v Saint Mary of Nazareth Hospital Center, 505 NE (2d) 314, 115 Ill (2d)
482 (1987).
44. See e.g. Doyle v Holy Cross Hospital, 708 NE (2d) 1140, 186 Ill (2d) 104 (1999).
45. Howard A Specter & Matthew W Finkin, Individual Employment Law and Litigation
(Charlottesville, Va: The Michie Company, 1989) at § 3.11.
46. See New York State Labor Relations Board v Metropolitan Life Insurance Company et al, 52
NYS (2d) 590, 15 LRRM 650 (Sup Ct 1944) [Metropolitan Life Insurance], aff’d 269 AD
934, 58 NYS (2d) 343 (App Div 1945), aff’d 295 NY 839, 66 NE (2d) 853 (1946). See also
International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees et al v P A Magazzu, Commerce Clearing
House’s Labor Relations Report (LRR), Report No. 148, ¶ 65, 022 (Penn Ct Com Pleas
1943) [Magazzu].
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a trade,”47 but the Pennsylvania court proceeded on a broader basis: that “the
rights of an individual citizen under the terms of the [state’s Labor Relations]
Act should not be different as a single employee of an employer, than as one of
three or more employees of the same employer.”48 Interestingly, Pennsylvania’s
Labor Relations Act defines a “representative” for the purpose of bargaining
as “any individual” as well as an organization.49 Theoretically, an individual
could designate herself as her own bargaining representative for a single person
bargaining unit, i.e. in those instances, no doubt rare, where the position the
employee occupies is not submerged in a wider community of interest with
other employees.

III. A Reflection on Actual Agency: Individual
Bargaining in an At-Will World
A century ago, advocates of laissez-faire pitted individual bargaining as
an alternative to collective bargaining;50 one hears the echo of this today.51
The necessary assumption is that the individual employee is clothed with
power to deal at arms-length with the employer. As we have seen, a portion
of American employment law today does clothe the employee with a right
to interact meaningfully with the employer over some terms and conditions of
employment—effectively, to represent oneself. But, for the most part, not only
does the law not do that, it allows the employer to treat the employee not as a
bargaining partner possessed of agency but as a being in a state of near tutelage,
akin to a child, who can be punished for speaking out of turn for the temerity of
asking for a better term or condition of employment. It would be expected that
in the ordinary course such power would be used sparingly, if at all, to eliminate

47.
48.
49.
50.

See Metropolitan Life Insurance, supra note 46 at 593.
See Magazzu, supra note 46.
Pa Stat Ann tit 43 § 211.3(e) (2009).
See e.g. US, National Industrial Conference Board, Individual and Collective Bargaining
Under the NIRA: A Statistical Study of Present Practice (New York: National Industrial
Conference Board, 1933). Note how Richard T Ely saw the future at the century’s turn:
The era of individual bargaining has passed away… . We must adjust ourselves to collective
bargains between organized labor on the one hand, and organized capital on the other. Not
suppression of organization, but regulation of organization, must be our watchword.

See Richard T Ely, Studies in the Evolution of Industrial Society (New York: The Macmillan
Company, 1903) at 390.
51. See Leo Troy’s quoted observation in Wheeler, supra note 4.
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the disgruntled,52 or, possibly, where collectivization is a prospect, as a signal to
others. But the mere possession of that power in reserve, as well as its occasional
exercise, negates any legal notion of actual agency.
The disconnect between the liberal conception of free labour and its legal
actualization reflects an ambiguity in usage. The neo-classical model speaks in
transactional terms of the labour market,53 which would seem to import the
notion of individual bargaining. The word “market” incites an image of the
Greek agora, the Middle Eastern souk, the medieval mercantile fair, or a street
scene on the lower east side of Manhattan at the turn of the twentieth century
lined with push carts before which sellers and buyers haggle face-to-face over
price and quality. But the neo-classical labour market model is decidedly not one
of face-to-face bargaining.54 In the neo-classical world, employers set wages
and working conditions unilaterally against the backdrop of the impersonal
forces of supply and demand. The “standard model,” though not hostile to a
bargaining scenario, is indifferent to it. Nevertheless, studies of the economics of
contractual transactions do attend to face-to-face bargaining; they are concerned
with bargaining power.55
In legal terms, an employee who is hired for an indefinite period, and so
serves at will, is a player in a near instantaneous series of contractual transactions:
At every instant the principal (the employer) offers employment to the agent
(the employee) on an “as is” or “take it or leave it” basis. The agent accepts these
terms merely by continuing in employment. At any instant the employer is free
to demand a change by making it, and the employee accepts by staying on.56
So too is the employee free at any moment to demand a change and to quit if
52. See e.g. Litton Systems, supra note 31.
53. See Henry N Butler & Keith W Chauvin, “Economic Analysis of Labor Markets: A
Framework for Analyzing Employment Law Issues” (1998) 8:1 Kan JL & Pub Pol’y 1 at 1
(“Labor markets, like all markets that are based on voluntary transactions, are created by
employees and employers agreeing to participate in a mutually-beneficial transaction”).
54. Ian Ayres & Stewart Schwab, “The Employment Contract” (1999) 8:3 Kan JL & Pub Pol’y
71 at 78. “[W]e are not assuming face to face negotiations in this standard model.”
55. The literature is surveyed by Nick van der Beck, as well as Mireia Artigot i Golobardes
and Fernando Gómez Pomar. See Nick van der Beck, “Long-term contracts in the law
and economics literature” in Gerrit De Geest, ed, Contract Law and Economics, 2d ed
(Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2011) 281; Mireia Artigot i Golobardes & Fernando
Gómez Pomar, “Long-term contracts in the law and economics literature” in (ibid), 314.
56. Some courts are troubled by the harshness of this model and attempt, however awkwardly,
to ameliorate the asperity by requiring some undefined breathing space before continuance
becomes assent. See Kauffman v International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 950 A (2d) 44 at 4748, 2008 DC App LEXIS 265.
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the employer does not agree. Economic theory confirms the common sense of
the situation: The party who possesses superior information, who has a better
alternative to accepting the term, who can hold out longer,57 or who is able to
impose a higher cost of disagreement on the other, has the superior bargaining
power. Under some circumstances the agent’s bargaining power can be zero.58
There are surely employees so strategically situated, possessed of such unique
knowledge or skill, or whose replacement would be attended by such heavy
transaction costs, that they have the upper hand in the relationship: high executives,
leading sales representatives, key scientific staff, popular actors, and athletes. But,
in the absence of these factors—where the employee can easily and cheaply be
replaced by another in the job queue, where the employee would have to endure
lost income and the cost of a possibly extended job search—the reverse would
be the case. For most employments, the employer would be expected to be in a
superior bargaining position.
Even so, it would seem to be one thing for an employer to flatly reject an
employee’s request for a raise, telling the employee that he was already being
“adequately compensated,”59 but quite another to be able to impose the severe
punishment of discharge for having asked.60 In other words, the at-will rule
bids fair to reduce the employee’s legal capacity to exercise agency to somewhere
below zero.
57. This is dwelt on elegantly by EH Phelps Brown. See EH Phelps Brown, The Economics of
Labor (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962) at 159-63. Not surprisingly, his subsequent
discussion, “Analysis of Bargaining Power,” concerns collective, not individual bargaining.
(Ibid) at 163-69.
58. Patrick Rey & Bernard Salanie, “Long-term, Short-term and Renegotiation: On the Value of
Commitment in Contracting” (1990) 58:3 Econometrica 597 at 606.
59. Litton Systems, supra note 31.
60. Various analogies to commercial transactions may present themselves where one party to
a long series of market transactions with another chooses to stop doing business. If that
decision were based on the price or quality of the product or service that was being supplied,
the decision would be analogous to a rejection of the offer, not a punishment for having
made it. If the decision was based on grounds without such commercial justification, it is
possible that a duty of good faith and fair dealing—adopted, for example, in the Uniform
Commercial Code for transactions between merchants—would come into play. See Melvin
Eisenberg, “Relational Contracts” in Jack Beatson & Daniel Friedman, eds, Good Faith and
Fault in Contract Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995) at ch 11. However, the prevailing
view in the United States is that there is no duty of good faith in the termination of
an at-will employment relationship. See Matthew W Finkin et al, “Working Group on
Chapter 2 of the Proposed Restatement of Employment Law” (2009) 13 Employee Rts &
Employment Pol’y J 93 at 133-42.
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IV. Broadening the Legal Horizon
Most developed economies in the democratic world have fair dismissal laws that
would prohibit discharge for seeking information or attempting to bargain for
something more. But some do more. The law outside the United States often
provides mandates for meaningful individual interaction on specific subjects61
as well as providing for collective information sharing and consultation. Two
examples taken from the Antipodes do both, but the strand of interest here is
their provision for individual self-representation. These suggest a range of the possible.
A. New Zealand

New Zealand’s Employment Relations Act of 2000, as amended in 2004, enacts a
robust scheme of individual representation.62 The employer and the individual
61. To cite but one example, the German Part-Time and Limited Term Employment Act (TzBfG)
allows an employee to request a reduction in working time. The employer must discuss the
request with the employee “with the goal of coming to an agreement” and must consent
unless operational reasons are prohibitive. The law is discussed by Maximilian Fuchs. See
Maximilian Fuchs, “Germany: part-time work – a bone of contention” in Silvana Sciarra,
Paul Davies & Mark Freedland, eds, Employment Policy and the Regulation of Part-Time Work
in the European Union: A Comparative Analysis (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press, 2004) 121. Claims of non-compliance with these obligations may be brought before
the labour court. Other examples abound; indeed, the law abroad often contemplates the
fact that individual bargains will be struck, and it sets the parameters within which such
individual bargains will be allowed. To take only working time, under the English Working
Time Regulations, SI 1998/1833, an agreement made with a group of employees, its
representatives, or an individual employee may derogate from the forty-eight hour work week
the law sets out, which entails a process of bargaining, in the latter, on an individual basis.
See generally Simon Deakin & Gillian Morris, Labour Law, 6th ed (Oxford: Hart, 2012).
Italian and Spanish law similarly allows an individual agreement to regulate the amount of
overtime the employee may be required to work. See Sciarra, Davies & Freedland, (ibid).
Canadian law allows employers to modify work schedules in excess of legal limits by vote of
70 per cent of the affected employees. See Federal Labour Standards Review, Control Over
Working Time and Work-Life Balance : A Detailed Analysis of the Canada Labour Code,
Part III by Judy Fudge (Ottawa: Human Resources and Skills Development Canada, 28
February 2006), online: <http://www.hrsdc.gc.ca/eng/labour/employment_standards/fls/pdf/
research17.pdf>.The need in Canada to “create incentives for interaction between employers
and employees” on work time was argued for by Harry Arthurs. See Federal Labour
Standards Review, Fairness at Work: Federal Labour Standards for the 21st Century (Gatineau,
QC: Human Resources and Skills Development Canada, 2006) at 120 (Commissioner:
Harry W Arthurs).
62. Employment Relations Act 2000 (NZ), 2000/24.
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employee63 “must deal with each other in good faith.”64 Good faith
requires the parties to an employment relationship to be active and constructive in
establishing and maintaining a productive employment relationship in which the
parties are, among other things, responsive and communicative… .65

This obligation applies to:
(ba) bargaining for an individual employment agreement or for a variation of an
individual employment agreement:
(bb) any matter arising under or in relation to an individual employment agreement
while the agreement is in force:
…
(d) a proposal by an employer that might impact on the employer’s employees,
including a proposal to contract out work otherwise done by the employees or
to sell or transfer all or part of the employer’s business:
(e) making employees redundant … .66

The Act specifies aspects of the bargaining process67 and adds a specific
illustration:
[A]n employer who is proposing to make a decision that will, or is likely to, have
an adverse effect on the continuation of employment of 1 or more of his or her
employees [is required] to provide to the employees affected—access to information,
relevant to the continuation of the employees’ employment, about the decision;
and an opportunity to comment on the information to their employer before the
decision is made.68

The employer’s obligation to be “active and constructive,” “responsive” to
and “communicative” with the individual employee in relation to any matter
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Ibid, s 4(4).
Ibid, s 4A(c).
Ibid, s 4A(b).
Ibid, s 4(4).
Ibid, s 63A(2). This section provides that:

The employer must do at least the following things:
(a) Provide to the employee a copy of the intended agreement under discussion; and
(b) Advise the employee that he or she is entitled to seek independent advice about the
intended agreement; and
(c) Give the employee a reasonable opportunity to seek that advice; and
(d) Consider any issues that the employee raises and respond to them.

It also sets out conditions that render an agreement “unfair” given the employee’s capacity
to contract or an inducement to contract by “oppressive means, undue influence, or duress.”
Ibid, s 68(2)(c). Additional sections also bear upon the freedom of individual representation,
e.g. to select a lawyer as a representative. Ibid, s 236.
68. Ibid, s 4(1A)(c).
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on which an employment agreement may be made seems to come close to the
American idea of engaging in a “meaningful interactive process,” save that it
applies to all extant and future employment issues, not only to the claim of a
specific statutory entitlement. The specific treatment of economic displacement
affecting even a single employee, requiring notice and an opportunity to be heard
before the decision is made, will be discussed at the close.
Suffice it to say, this law is very much a work in progress. How the scheme of
statutorily mandated individual good faith dealing will work in practice remains
to be seen,69 but it does present a model that accommodates the felt need for
self-representation, that accords legal recognition of individual agency.
B. Australia

In 2009, Australia enacted the Fair Work Act (FWA),70 an elaborate and, to an
outsider, maddeningly complicated system that resonates against the Industrial
Relations Act of 1988 and ensuing overhauls in 1996 and 2005.71 The FWA
provides for the negotiation of an “enterprise” collective agreement (for a
non-greenfield enterprise).72 An employer may choose to bargain with any
employee organization if even a single employee of the enterprise is a member
of it—so long as it has the capacity to represent the industrial interests of
that member—or with any person appointed by an employee,73 which could
be the employee him- or herself.74 (The employer becomes legally obligated to
bargain if there is a majority support determination or a “scope order” in place.75)
Therefore, it is possible that an employer must bargain, and bargain in good faith,
with a diverse group of unions, representatives of individual employees, and the
69. Gordon Anderson, “Good Faith in the Individual Employment Relationship in New
Zealand” (2011) 32:3 Comp Lab L & Pol’y J 685.
70. Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) [FWA].
71. Andrew Stewart and Anthony Forsyth provide a useful guide to the background. See Andrew
Stewart & Anthony Forsyth, “The Journey from Work Choices to Fair Work” in Anthony
Forsyth & Andrew Stewart, eds, Fair Work: The New Workplace Laws and the Work Choices
Legacy (Sydney, Aust: The Federation Press, 2009) ch 1.
72. A greenfield agreement is an agreement setting out the employment conditions between
an employer and a union for an enterprise that does not have employees. See “What’s an
enterprise agreement,” online: Australian Government Fair Work Ombudsman <https://
www.fairwork.gov.au/employment/agreements/pages/default.aspx>.
73. FWA, supra note 70, s 176(1)(b)-(c). Employees must also be given notice of their
representational rights. Ibid, s 174.
74. Ibid, s 176(4).
75. See Breen Creighton & Andrew Stewart, Labour Law, 5th ed (Sydney, Aust: The Federation
Press, 2010) at 21.48-21.58.
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self-represented, all at the same bargaining table.76 The statute contemplates that
an enterprise agreement will provide for future employee consultations and sets
out a “model consultation” provision, a default term to be implied in the absence
of agreement.77 The text is set out below. Even as it contemplates a system of
plural representation, it would appear quite possible for it to have purchase on
an individual self-representational basis.
Model consultation term78
(1) This term applies if:
(a) the employer has made a definite decision to introduce a major change to
production, program, organization, structure, or technology in relation to
its enterprise; and
(b) the change is likely to have a significant effect on employees of the enterprise.
(2) The employer must notify the relevant employees of the decision to introduce
the major change.
(3) The relevant employees may appoint a representative for the purposes of the
procedures in this term.
(4) If:
(a) A relevant employee appoints, or relevant employees appoint, a representative
for the purposes of consultation; and
(b) The employee or employees advise the employer of the identity of the
representative; the employer must recognize the representative.
(5) As soon as practicable after making its decision, the employer must:
(a) Discuss with the relevant employees:
(i) the introduction of the change; and
(ii) the effect the change is likely to have on the employees; and
(iii) measures the employer is taking to avert or mitigate the adverse effect of
the change on the employees; and
(b) for the purposes of the discussion—provide, in writing, to the relevant
employees;
76. However, the number of bargaining representatives can be rationalized if the bargaining
process is not proceeding efficiently because of multiple representation. See ibid, ss 229(4)
(a)(ii), 230(3)(a)(ii), 231(2)(a)-(b). In order to take effect, an enterprise agreement must be
approved by the agency that administers the Act, called Fair Work Australia. In turn, they
must be satisfied that the agreement has been “genuinely agreed to by the employees covered
by the agreement.” This is shown by a vote of approval by a majority of the employees
to be covered by the enterprise agreement, subject to other procedural and substantive
requirements. Ibid, ss 181, 188.
77. The model clause is based on one rooted in a 1984 decision of the Australian Conciliation
and Arbitration Commission.
78. Fair Work Regulations 2009 (Cth), reg 2.09 [emphasis added].
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(i) all relevant information about the change including the nature of the
change proposed; and
(ii) information about the expected effects of the change on the employees;
and
(iii) any other matters likely to affect the employees.
(6) However, the employer is not required to disclose confidential or commercially
sensitive information to the relevant employees.
(7) The employer must give prompt and genuine consideration to matters raised
about the major change by the relevant employees.
…
(9) In this term, a major change is likely to have a significant effect on employees if it
results in:
(a) the termination of the employment of employees; or
(b) major change to the composition, operation or size of the employer’s workforce
or to the skills required of employees; or
(c) the elimination or diminution of job opportunities (including opportunities
for promotion or tenure); or
(d) the alteration of hours of work; or
(e) the need to retrain employees; or
(f ) the need to relocate employees to another workplace; or
(g) the restructuring of jobs.

This scheme is also a work in progress. That reservation in mind, it imposes a
duty of good faith bargaining owed to the individual, albeit not as an individual,
but as a self-representative. New Zealand law gives the individual employee legal
agency at large, so to speak. Australian law is more closely cabined. But both
require an employer to inform an employee of the prospect of a job-terminating
decision and to entertain the employee’s proposals: in New Zealand, while the
decision is under consideration, but before it is made; in Australia, when the
decision is made, but before it is implemented. With these experiments in mind,
let us return to the scene in the United States.

V. Making Self-Representation Meaningful
American employees seem to want to represent themselves to have a direct voice in
some workplace matters of deep concern. Over 50 per cent want to be heard about
job training, for example, which is a critical issue in an era of plant closings, downsizing,
and outsourcing.79 Can the law better accommodate this felt need?
79. Freeman & Rogers, supra note 1 at 48.
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A. Federal Law

Not to put too fine a point on it, the political prospect of general legislative address
reforming the system of employee representation at the federal level is nil.80 Thus,
it falls to the National Labor Relations Board to fashion national labour policy
within the confines of an increasingly anachronistic statute. Given the history,
text, and long-standing construction of the Act to preclude bargaining units of one
person, it would be extremely difficult for the Board to discover that possibility to
have been latent in the Act all along, but even more difficult to create a general
right of individual self-representation where the individual is not uniquely situated
vis-à-vis her co-workers. However, that there is no prospect of a federal right of
self-representation does not mean that employees should labour under the threat
of discharge for having attempted it.
The statutory and historical basis for the right of the individual employee to
present a demand or a work-related grievance without suffering retaliation was
explored thirty years ago.81 The nonsensical distinctions the Board and the courts
draw under the current state of the law tests our tolerance for legal perversity. It
makes no sense to have the question of whether an employee may ask for a pay
increase turn on whether a co-worker joins him or her in making the request.
Nor does it make sense to hold the discharge of an employee for making such
a request to be unprotected, whilst holding a co-worker’s protest about the
unfairness of the discharge to be protected, as that employee would be making
common cause with her co-worker for mutual protection. Would any nation
in the civilized world allow an employee to be discharged for informing his
employer that he thought his paycheck was inaccurate?82
80. On why this is, see James J Brudney, “Gathering Moss: The NLRA’s Resistance to Legislative
Change” (2011) 26 ABA J Lab & Emp L 161.
81. Robert A Gorman & Matthew W Finkin, “The Individual and the Requirement of ‘Concert’
Under the National Labor Relations Act” (1981) 130:2 U Pa L Rev 286 at 331-46.
82. See Ryder Tank Lines Inc v Reese, 135 NLRB 936, 49 LRRM (BNA) 1597, enf ’d on other
grounds NLRB v Ryder Tank Lines, Inc, 310 f (2d) 233, 51 LRRM 2512 (4th Cir 1962). The
facts were these:

About a week before he was terminated Bough complained to Terminal Manager Morrison
that he (Bough) had not received the amount of money that he believed he was entitled to
for layover time on a trip which he had recently made. Bough and Morrison did not arrive
at a mutually satisfactory disposition of this matter and on or about June 9, 1960, Bough
(in accordance with a procedure recommended by Respondent) took the matter up with
Respondent’s operation manager (Kruggel), who in turn consulted Morrison about the matter.
Morrison testified that he resented this appeal to Kruggel even though it was in accord with
suggestions made earlier by Kruggel and that when he (Morrison) was given the opportunity
to select the third man to be laid off he selected Bough because of his going “over my head.”
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Nevertheless, even this measure, which meets the demand for individual
voice only halfway, would face heavy sledding in the courts given the longevity of
the statute’s more cribbed reading. And so it would fall to the states, historically
the law’s experiment stations,83 to fill the gap.
B. State Law

Overwhelmingly, individual employment law is state law found in the common
law of contract and tort and in hundreds of discrete pieces of legislation, from
broad prohibitions to measures dealing with very specific evils. Under the law of
federal pre-emption, the state may not regulate that which is arguably prohibited or
protected by the Labor Act, but the state can enact a floor of workplace protections
including, for example, a general prohibition on wrongful dismissal.
Consequently, whereas under current doctrine the state may not afford relief
for employees who are dismissed for exercising collective voice per se, unconnected
to the vindication of some other public policy84 (a bizarre state of affairs!), there is
Ibid at 943. The Board agreed with the Trial Examiner that Manard Bough’s discharge did
not violate the Act as his action was “purely personal.” Ibid at 938. The case remains the
law today. As noted earlier, the courts are divided on whether an employee who points out
that the employer has not made its contributions to his pension can be discharged under
federal pension protection law for having done so. Junior Achievement, supra note 28.
Today, many states allow tort relief for the discharge of an at-will employee for a reason
that violates public policy. However, the Supreme Court of South Carolina has held that
public policy is not implicated in the discharge of an at-will employee for informing her
local manager that she was not being paid according to the terms agreed to. See Barron v
Labor Finders of South Carolina, 713 SE (2d) 634, 393 SC 609 (2011). Had the employee
filed a claim for the wage due under the state’s wage payment law, rather than asking her
manager for it, it is possible that a retaliatory discharge would be actionable. See Campbell
v Husky Hogs, LLC, 255 P (3d) 1, 292 Kan 225 (Sup Ct 2011). This is only so where
the statute is held to implicate the public good. The Kansas Court thought so, but the
Colorado courts have not been so sure. See Crawford Rehabilitation Services Inc v Weissman,
938 P (2d) 540, 1997 Colo LEXIS 491 (Sup Ct) (discharge for insisting on taking
statutorily guaranteed rest breaks was not actionable). Thus far, demanding an employer’s
adherence to state wage payment or minimum wage law is not considered protected
activity in Illinois. See Trochuck v Patterson Companies Inc, 851 F Supp (2d) 1147, 2012
US Dist LEXIS 37056 (SD Ill).
83. Matthew W Finkin, “Gli Stati Come Laboratori Di Diritto Del Lavoro. Stati Uniti E Unione
Europea A Confronto.” (2011) 30:3 Rivista Italiana Di Diritto Del Lavoro 401.
84. See Inter-Modal Rail Employees Association v Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway
Company et al, 87 Cal Rptr (2d) 60, 73 Cal App (4th) 918 (1999). The state remedy
for discharge for group activity over safety was not pre-empted because it was grounded
in state public policy. Compare Luke v Collotype Labels USA Inc, 72 Cal Rptr (3d) 440,
159 Cal App (4th) 1463 (2008). The state remedy for discharge of employee for assisting
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no obstacle to a state extending its public policy to the discharge of an employee
who exercises individual voice on his or her own behalf. Such a step would take
individual self-representation out of the shadow of employer retribution, but it would
not impose a general obligation to engage in a meaningful interactive process with the
employee. Could a state take that next step?
No legal impediment presents itself. The federal Labor Act pre-empts the
regulation of collective bargaining for the employments it covers, but affording a
right of individual self-representation, akin to New Zealand law and the individual
self-representational aspect of Australian law, would not enter that field. As the
Board observed when it declined to certify single person bargaining units:
[T]he principle of collective bargaining presupposes that there is more than one
eligible person who desires to bargain. The Act therefore does not empower the
Board to certify where only one employee is involved. This conclusion does not
mean that a single employee may not designate a representative to act for him; he
has such a right without the Act, and the Act in no way limits the right. By the
same token, this conclusion in no way limits the protection which the Act otherwise
gives such an employee.85

As affording the individual the right to bargain for himself or herself does
not intrude into the federal scheme, there is no legal reason why, in the absence of
a collective representative, a state could not afford such a right even to employees
of employers within the Labor Board’s jurisdiction.
The obstacle is not legal, but political, grounded in management’s foreseeable
objection to the transaction costs the law would impose—to be required to deal
and in good faith with all manner of demands and complaints made by each of
its employees in a meaningful interactive process. The claim might have purchase
in employments with large numbers of employees, for smaller employers tend to
have personal interactions with their employees as a matter of course, and these
businesses tend to be excluded from the reach of much labour-protective law
in any event. But these larger employments, where the claim of undue burden
would be most obvious to make, also maintain human resource departments
that are established in part to administer employment policies and to deal with
employee complaints. Consequently, it is not the prospect of meaningful interaction
that would be objectionable, but rather, the imposition of a legal duty to do so,
subject to potential judicial oversight. In other words, the very open-endedness of
the obligation would surely be argued to be an impediment to managerial flexibility,
co-workers in making complaints on working conditions was pre-empted. This anomaly
surely calls for the recalibration of pre-emption doctrine, but that is for another day.
85. Luckenbach Steamship, supra note 29 at 193 [emphasis added].
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despite the fact that the prospect of any significant amount of individual litigation on
the quality of the interactive process would seem remote in the absence of statutory
attorney fees or class certification.
In any event, a more sharply focussed approach commends itself: one that
builds on specific interactive duties already extant in US law, presents little of the
“floodgate of litigation” argument a general obligation would elicit, and draws
sustenance from the more specific provisions in both Australia and New Zealand.
These laws are adverted to not because they are unique—they are not86—but
because they are from kindred common law English-speaking jurisdictions, “in
the family,” so to speak.87 They give a sense of the range of the legally possible,
within that zone of comfort.
Such a law would accord a right of meaningful interaction over those
specific decisions that will have an adverse effect on the employee’s very
employment—outsourcing, downsizing, or major changes in technology,
production, or organization. These are not snap decisions; they are, or should
be, the product of study and deliberation, to which it cannot be said that the voice
86. Many European countries have well developed systems of works councils and methods
of collective information sharing and consultation. See generally, Ulrich Mückenberger,
“Workers’ Representation at the Plant and Enterprise Level” in Bob Hepple & Bruno
Veneziani, eds, The Transformation of Labour Law in Europe: A comparative study of 15
countries 1945-2004 (Oxford: Hart, 2009) ch 8. Such is now required of all member states,
including the United Kingdom. See EC, Commission Directive 2002/14/EC of 11 March
2002 establishing a general framework for informing and consulting employees in the European
Community, OJ 2002 L 80/29. Pursuant to the Directive on Collective Redundancies,
involving plant closing and mass layoff, the consultative process must be carried on “with
a view to reaching an agreement” which, as Simon Deakin and Gillian Morris point out,
“takes it close to negotiation.” See EC, Commission Directive 98/59/EC of 20 July 1998 on
the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to collective redundancies, OJ 1998
L 225/16, s 2, art 3(1); Simon Deakin & Gillian S Morris, Labour Law, 5th ed (Oxford:
Hart, 2009) at 791. The duty to consult, with a view to reaching an agreement with a
representative designated by the affected employees, means that employees who are not
represented by a union must be given notice and an opportunity to elect representatives.
Ibid at 802-06. This creates a framework for the ad hoc formation of collective voice, not of
individual voice. So too, would an approach modeled on Australian or New Zealand law,
insofar as affected employees pool their representational efforts.
87. The claim that the common law family is better conducing than those systems deriving from
the civil law, for economically efficient results, has effectively been debunked. See Simon
Deakin & Katharina Pistor, eds, Legal Origin Theory (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar,
2012); Nuno Garoupa & Andrew P Morriss, “The Fable of the Codes: The Efficiency of the
Common Law, Legal Origins, and Codification Movements” (2012) U Ill L Rev 1443. These
laws have been chosen because, to US legislators, they might be seen as somehow less foreign
than European jurisdictions.
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of those who would be displaced would have nothing to add. These decisions can
have devastating consequences for employees, their families, and their communities.
The exploration of the bases for, alternatives to, and the consequences of such
decisions with affected employees is no impediment to good management, but
such interaction may result in a modification of the decision or the amelioration
of its worst asperities. Job retraining, for example, is a matter on which employees
want to be heard as individuals, as their aptitudes and desires are particular to the
individual, and it takes on special salience in situations of reorganization and
retrenchment. Federal and cognate state law have taken the first, albeit limited
step of requiring notice of plant closing or mass layoff. If the affected employees
are collectively represented, the employer is required to bargain about the
effects of such decisions with the collective representative, in consequence of
which the decision itself might be modified.88 Is there any good reason why
employers should not give non-unionized employees a meaningful opportunity
to be heard about such personally and communally devastating decisions while
they are under consideration or before they are finally executed? And, if none
appears, why should they not be required to do so?

VI. A Rumination on the Future of SelfRepresentation
As the Introduction pointed out, meaningful employee voice in the United States has
been traditionally conceived of almost exclusively in terms of collective bargaining.
Critics of individual bargaining thought of it as little more than an ideological fig
leaf enhancing managerial power or blunting collectivization, and, in the United
States, the law largely abets that skepticism.89 Nevertheless, here and there the
law has edged towards clothing the individual with actual agency. The result
is legal dissonance: The common law sometimes corrects for informational
asymmetry when entering at-will employment, but, more often than not, not
thereafter. Statutes supervene to establish a balance in bargaining power, but only
on an ad hoc basis, the statutory ticket being good for that trip only. And absent
88. First National Maintenance Corp v National Labor Relations Board, 452 US 666, 101 S Ct
2573 (1981).
89. Whence the tension—or ambivalence—in Australia’s dual track system. See Creighton
& Stewart, supra note 75. For more on the system of “individualized collectivism” see
Breen Creighton, “A Retreat from Individualism? The Fair Work Act 2009 and the
Re-collectivisation of Australian Labour Law” (2011) 40:2 Indus LJ 116. See also Shae
McCrystal, “Fair Work in the International Spotlight: The CEPU Complaint to the ILO’s
Committee on Freedom of Association” (2011) 24 Austl J Lab L 163.
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some special protection, an employee, being at-will, may be dismissed with
impunity for seeking to bargain individually with his or her employer, or even
to secure information from it.
In other words, the law’s conception of the employee is Janus-like: one face
sees the employee as an adult who should be clothed with the legal capacity for
meaningful interaction with her employer; the other sees the employee as a child
who may be punished (or orphaned) for attempting to do so, not because her effort
to represent herself is framed in opprobrious terms or is any way disruptive, but
because it is made at all.
There is no prospect of change in the current state of conceptual dissonance.
However, as private sector unions disappear, it is possible that legal scope will be
legislated for individual self-representation on an unfolding agenda of discrete
issues. If so, it remains to be seen whether employees so clothed will come to
see the limits of effective self-representation;90 and, if so, whether the exercise
of self-representation might stimulate demand for yet more91 and might drive,
however modestly, towards a revitalization of collective action.

90. There are limits grounded in the inadequacy of individual bargaining to deal with collective
goods. Note that only one-third of employees in the Freeman and Rogers survey believe in
self-representation over benefits, job safety, and health, whereas a majority believe in selfrepresentation over issues of fairness and harassment. See Freeman & Rogers, supra note 1.
91. John Witte’s study of one workplace more than a generation ago found that the desire for
participation was expressed more by those who already had some involvement. See John F
Witte, Democracy, Authority, and Alienation in Work: Workers’ Participation in an American
Corporation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980) at 27-28. A subsequent study
of another workplace confirmed Witte’s finding. See Marc Lendler, Just the Working Life
(Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 1990) at 75. On that, Lendler suggests that the provision for the
exercise of voice has “carryover effects.” Ibid at 80.

